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内 容 摘 要 
事主张损害赔偿责任。 
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The right of profits-revoking is different from the right of trade-intervention in 
terms of content and effect. Different countries also have distinct provisions about the 
relationship between the right of claiming compensation for damages and right of 
profits-revoking or trade-intervention. Is the article 149 of Company Law of the 
People's Republic of China reasonable? What is the relationship between right of 
profits-revoking in Article 149 and the right of claiming compensation for damages in 
Article 150? These are the main issues discussed in this paper. 
In the first chapter, the concept of director is defined. It includes natural person 
directors and legal person directors who undertake the management of corporate and 
are responsible for it. Directors are appointed by corporate. Therefore, the number of 
people liable for compensation are restricted by asking directors who didn’t perform 
the obligation of prohibiting from being engaged in the same business to corporate to 
take the responsibility of compensation. 
In the second chapter, the basic content of obligation of prohibiting directors 
from being engaged in the same business to corporate is analyzed. The prohibition of 
business strife is a contract liability, not a legal liability. Directors who didn’t perform 
it must take the liability for breach of contract. 
In the third chapter, ways of taking liability for breach of contract and range of 
damages to be paid are discussed. At first, we analyze the internal consequences. 
Directors who break the prohibition have to take liability for breach of contract. 
Directors’ liability for breach of contract shall be in the form of  recovering the 
damages in comply with the principle of equalizing the damages suffered, limited to 
the performing interests of corporate which corporate would get by realizing its credit. 
Corporate is entitled to claim the interests of the like business directors work in by 
treating the like business directors work in as corporate business directors work in. 
That is the right of trade-intervention. Beyond the right of profit-revoking, corporate 
also has the right to claim compensation for its other damages. Thus, the right of 
profit-revoking overlaps the right to claim recovery. And, the right of profit-revoking 
is embodied in the trade-intervention. 














business strife are analyzed. Right of profits-revoking is a right of claim in nature. 
Corporate could only make its claim to the law-breaking directors, not directly to the 
business counterpart. Corporate could not get the ownership until directors submit 
profits to it.  
At last, we get the conclusion of this paper. We think such provisions should be 
included in the judicial interpretation of Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China. Without the consent of the shareholders' meeting or shareholders' assembly, 
seeking business opportunities for himself or any other person by taking advantages 
of his authorities, or operating for himself or for any other person any like business of 
the company he works for, the profits should be submitted to corporate. It is the right 
of profits-revoking, with the nature of the right of claim. Corporate could only claim 
its right against the directors. The shareholders' meeting has the right to treat the 
business directors work for as that of corporate. Apart from this, if corporate suffered 
other damages from the directors’ behavior, it is also entitled to claim its rights of 
recovery.   
 
Key Words：Right of Profits-revoking；Right of Trade-intervention； 
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引   言  1
 
























行使损害赔偿请求权。例如德国《股份法》（1937 年颁布并施行）第 88 条第 2
项规定：“董事会成员违反竞业禁止义务，公司可请求损害赔偿，公司可以代之
以向该成员请求，其承受将以自己的计算成立的行为视为是以公司的计算缔结
                                                        
① 采此称谓者例如：杨立新．论违反竞业禁止的侵权行为[J]．法律适用，2004，(11)：9－14．  张庆东．公
司立法中竞业禁止规定的法律适用[J]．人民司法，2002，(5)：39－41． 桂菊平．竞业禁止若干法律问题














论董事违反竞业禁止义务的法律后果  2 
的，并交付由以他人的计算成立的行为取得的报酬，或让与其报酬请求权。”① 又
如，《日本商法典》（1899 年颁布并施行）第 264 条第 1款规定：“董事为自己
或第三人利益，进行属于公司营业类型的交易时，须取得董事会同意。”同条第
3款规定：“董事违反第 1款规定为自己从事交易时，董事会可以将该交易视为
公司所从事的交易。”同法第 266 条第 1 款规定董事实施违反法令或者公司章
程的行为时，对公司造成损害，应承担赔偿责任。
②
 对于第 264 条第 3 款，学
者多称之为“交易介入权”，与第 266 条第 1 款的损害赔偿请求权之间构成互
补关系。
③④












学者就明确指出，与其认为商法典第 264 条第 3款规定的是利益归入权，不如说
                                                        
① 杜景林&卢堪译．德国股份法··德国有限责任公司法·德国参与决定法[Z]．北京：中国政法大学出版
社，2000．39． 
② 吴建斌等译 ．日本公司法规范[Z]．北京：法律出版社，2003．106． 以下若无特别说明，有关日本《商
法典》中的公司法条文均出自此译本。值得注意的是，日本在 2005 年 6 月 29 日颁布了新的公司法修正案(称
《会社法典》，目前未生效)，对现行商法典作了部分修改。与本文有关的变动部分，下文会特别注明。资
料来源：日本众议院网站．http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_gian htm/   访问日期 2006 年 1 月 12
日 
③ [日]神作裕之．董事违反竞业禁止义务的后果[A]．[日]北泽正启．商法的争点(Ⅰ)[C]．东京：有斐阁，
1985．148-149． [日]岛袋铁男．行使商法二六四条的介入权的效果[A]．同上．150-151．   [日]牛丸兴志
夫．董事的竞业禁止义务[A]．[日]鸿常夫．会社判例百选[C]．东京：有斐阁，1993．104-105．  [日]小桥
一郎．董事违反竞业禁止义务与介入权行使的效果[A]．同上．106-107．  




董事之间处于利益相反状态。例如，公司为董事债务提供保证。”第 356 条之 2 规定：“董事违反前项规定
者，董事会可将该交易视为为公司所从事的交易。”第 423 条规定：“董事懈怠任务对公司造成损害的，应
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